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institutions for monitoring and enforcement promote cooperation? Finally, what classes 
of strategies are employed to achieve high efficiency?  We find that, first, cooperation 
can  be  sustained  even  in  anonymous  settings;  second,  some  type  of  monitoring  and 
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indiscriminate strategies and prefer selective strategies.  
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1 Introduction 
There is a growing interest in economics for models of anonymous and decentralized 
interaction. A possible cause for this interest is that societies have become increasingly 
anonymous  and  the  frequency  of  repeated  interaction  has  declined.  This  interest  is 
reflected  in  the  adoption  of  trading  environments  populated  by  a  large  number  of 
individuals who meet at random. Such frameworks are used, for example, in Diamond 
(1982) to model the existence of frictions in trading, in Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) to 
provide  the  foundations  for  monetary  exchange,  in  Dixit  (2003)  to  study  economic 
governance, and in Shimer (2005) to analyze unemployment. When agents interact as 
strangers, as in the above settings, there exist frictions in cooperation and coordination 
among agents, hence achieving optimum outcomes is a challenge. 
   Economic  theory  has  shown  that  even  in  anonymous  groups,  cooperation  is 
theoretically possible as long as individuals are involved in a long-term interaction. The 
theoretical  foundation  can  be  traced  back to  the  folk  theorems  for  infinitely  repeated 
games (supergames) of Friedman (1971) and the subsequent random-matching extensions 
in Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994). The basic theoretical result is that cooperation is an 
equilibrium  if  agents  are  sufficiently  patient.  There  exists  very  limited  empirical 
evidence, however, regarding the above environments. 
This paper studies matching economies in an experiment where pairs of strangers 
“infinitely”  play  a  prisoners’  dilemma.  Strangers  are  anonymous  subjects  who  are 
randomly matched in each period, and their histories are private information. In these 
economies the Pareto efficient outcome is not an equilibrium in the one-shot game, but, 
for an appropriate choice of parameters, it is one of the equilibria if the horizon is infinite. 
Kandori  (1992)  and  Ellison  (1994)  proved  that  the  Pareto  efficient  outcome  can  be 
achieved by  adopting  social  norms  of cooperation  that rely  on the threat of a “grim-
trigger”  punishment  scheme,  i.e.,  economy-wide  defection.  Basically,  a  subject 
cooperates unless someone has been caught defecting, in which case the subject should 
forever defect.    2
  In practice, however, achieving the Pareto efficient outcome may be problematic 
because subjects are not in a stable partnership, cannot communicate their intentions to 
others, and can neither commit to nor enforce cooperation. One also wonders whether the 
subject perceives the grim-trigger punishment as a plausible threat. Given these frictions, 
subjects face a double challenge: not only must they be able to coordinate on the Pareto 
efficient outcome, but also coordinate on a credible threat that can support continuous 
cooperation. Our goal is to identify behavioral elements and institutional characteristics 
that are associated to the emergence, sustainability, and breakdown of cooperation. 
This  paper  reports  the  experimental  results  from  four  treatments  of  matching 
economies  where  interaction  is  indefinitely  repeated,  based  on  a  probabilistic 
continuation rule. Treatments differ in two dimensions: the level of information about 
action  histories  and  the  punishment  technology.  Under  private  monitoring,  subjects 
observed only their own history and under public monitoring, they observed the history 
of the whole economy. In some treatments subjects could only punish by defecting, while 
in the personal punishment treatment, they could pay a cost to inflict a loss on their 
opponent.  
Our  study  addresses  the  following  research  questions:  can  strangers  who  interact 
indefinitely achieve substantial levels of cooperation and efficiency? Which institutions 
for  monitoring  and  enforcement  promote  cooperation?  What  classes  of  strategies  are 
adopted in economies that achieve high efficiency? We obtained the following results. 
First,  efficiency  levels  in  our  experimental  economies  are  high  and  increasing  with 
experience, even under private monitoring; this result provides empirical support for the 
theoretical  findings  in  Kandori  (1992)  and  Ellison  (1994).  Second,  costly  personal 
punishment significantly promotes cooperation; however, not all monitoring institutions 
promote  cooperation.  We  report  high  cooperation  levels  in  situations  where  subjects 
know identities and histories of opponents (non-anonymous public monitoring) but not 
when  identities  are  unobservable  (anonymous  public  monitoring).  Finally,  subjects 
appear to have preferences for certain strategies. In particular, the average subject: (a) 
avoids indiscriminate strategies; (b) shows a strong tendency to defect with opponents   3
who  have  “cheated”  her  in  the  past;  and  (c)  tends  to  disregard  information  on  the 
opponent’s behavior in other matches.  
One can identify three main contributions. Our study of indefinite interactions among 
strangers complements and extends the experimental literature on indefinitely repeated 
games,  which  has  mostly  focused  on  interactions  among  partners  (recent  examples 
include Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1994; Aoyagi and Frechette, 2003; Dal Bó, 2005; Duffy 
and  Ochs,  2006).  Second,  our  experimental  findings  can  help  define  an  empirically-
relevant criterion for equilibrium selection, based on behavioral considerations. This is 
important from  a  practical standpoint  because random  matching  models often display 
multiple  equilibria  with  various levels  of  efficiency,  but  an  unambiguous equilibrium 
selection criterion is missing  (e.g., see the monetary equilibria in Aliprantis et al., 2006, 
2007).  Our  laboratory  findings  shed  light  on  what  type  of  economic  institutions may 
facilitate the emergence of norms of cooperation in anonymous societies, complementing 
a  growing  literature  devoted  to  uncover  theoretical  links  between  the  availability  of 
enforcement  and  punishment  institutions  on  one  side,  and  patterns  of  exchange  and 
cooperation on the other (e.g., Krasa and Villamil, 2000; Dixit, 2003).  
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the related literature; Section 3 
presents the experimental design; Section 4 provides a theoretical analysis; results are 
reported in Section 5; and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Related experimental literature 
Our  paper  builds  on  the  experimental  literature  on  infinitely  repeated  games 
(supergames), whose theoretical foundation can be traced back to Friedman (1971).  Roth 
and  Murnighan  (1978)  were  the  first  to  implement  infinitely  repeated  games  in  an 
experiment by employing a probabilistic continuation rule, which transforms it into an 
indefinitely repeated game. For risk-neutral subjects, a constant continuation probability 
is theoretically equivalent to assuming a constant discount rate and an infinite horizon. 
 A number of experiments have adopted probabilistic continuation rules to study the 
empirical  validity  of  folk  theorems  for  supergames.  A  basic  result  is  that  subjects   4
perceive  the  differences  in  the  incentive  structure  of  a  finitely  repeated  versus  an 
indefinitely repeated interaction, and react in the expected direction. For example, Palfrey 
and Rosenthal (1994) and Dal  Bó (2005) report lower cooperation for finite duration 
experiments in comparison to indefinite duration experiment with a the same expected 
length. Moreover, the higher the discount rate the lower the cooperation. For a recent 
discussion see Normann and Wallace (2006). 
   In order to place our contribution within the existing literature, and given our focus 
on the models in Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994), we will discuss indefinitely repeated 
experiments  whose  stage  game  is  a  prisoner’s  dilemma  (for  experiments  with  other 
games  see  Cason  and  Khan,  1999,  Engle-Warnick  and  Slonim,  2004,  2006,  Engle-
Warnick, 2007).  It is helpful to classify experiments with indefinite interaction according 
to two aspects, the matching protocols and the availability of information supplied about 
other  subjects.  The  protocol  to  match  subjects  within  a  supergame  is  an  empirically 
relevant  and  theoretically  interesting  parameter.  Furthermore,  all  experiments  we 
surveyed  include  several  supergames  within  a  session,  and  hence  need  an  additional 
protocol to match the subjects after each supergame. We will come back later to this 
matching across supergames and for now focus on matching within a supergame.  
   The most common matching protocol within a supergame is fixed matching. For 
instance  see  Palfrey  and  Rosenthal  (1994),  Aoyagi  and  Frechette  (2003),  or  Dal  Bó 
(2005). Under this design, which we refer to as “partner”, subjects always interact with 
the same person and generally support a significant level of cooperation, sometimes full 
cooperation.  The present study employs instead a random matching protocol within a 
supergame as, for instance, in Schwartz et al. (1999) and Duffy and Ochs (2006). In any 
given period subjects still meet in pairs but after each period new pairs are randomly 
formed drawing among subjects from a larger economy with N>2 people.  
   A comparison of fixed matching (partner) versus a random matching (stranger) in 
finitely repeated games can be found in Andreoni and Croson (2002) and indefinitely 
repeated games can be found in Duffy and Ochs (2006). This latter study has a random 
matching treatment with private monitoring and the parameters were set in a way that full   5
cooperation was an equilibrium outcome. The study finds remarkably higher cooperation 
in fixed than in random matching economies. Therefore, despite the theoretical viability 
of cooperative equilibria with random matching and private monitoring, it seems that 
they are empirically difficult to attain. 
A  key  parameter  when  comparing  cooperation  rates  between  fixed  and  random 
matching treatments is the expected number of encounters with any given person. This 
number is higher under fixed matching than random matching for economies of equal 
size and identical continuation probability. As a consequence the deck is stacked in favor 
of observing higher cooperation in fixed matching. To avoid this bias, we do not use a 
partner treatment. Instead we introduce a novel design that, on one hand, equalizes the 
expected number of encounters with any given person across treatments, while on the 
other hand, provides as much information as in the partner treatment. The new design has 
random matching and public monitoring, as we provide the complete history for each 
agent in the economy. A subject knows the identity of their opponent (non-anonymous) 
as well as what their opponent chose when meeting other participants.
1  
   A  second  novel  feature  of  our  study  is  to  understand  which one of  the  several 
available strategies that support a given equilibrium outcome have been employed.
2 This 
issue has been largely unexplored in the experimental literature on supergames, as it has 
mostly  focused  on  measuring  the  levels  of  cooperation.  As  we  will  later  clarify,  we 
develop a design where we can exploit differences in information across treatments in 
order to change the strategy set and hence identify the type of strategies employed.  
   We also relate the choice of punishment strategy in an indefinitely repeated setting 
to the literature on costly personal punishment in one-shot settings. Experimental studies 
of finitely repeated social dilemmas have evidenced a surprising tendency of subjects to 
engage in costly personal punishment of others, in particular defectors. Although, this 
                                                 
1 Schwartz et al. (1999) and Duffy and Ochs (2006) also consider treatments when subjects receive some 
information about the reputation of their current opponent while preserving anonymity of the opponent. 
Our non-anonymous public monitoring gives all individual histories and so provides information about 
reputation and it also reveals the identity of the opponent. 
2 These strategies include off-equilibrium threats that on the equilibrium path will never be employed. The 
features of such threats are largely irrelevant as long as they are credible and they generate a sufficiently 
low continuation payoff.   6
behavior is inconsistent with personal income maximization, it has been shown to be 
remarkably robust (Ostrom et al, 1992; Fehr and Gaechter, 2002; Casari and Plott, 2003). 
A  third  novel  feature  of  our  study  is  to  examine  how  this  behavioral  trait  may  be 
employed in supporting the cooperative equilibrium in an infinitely repeated game, where 
there does already exist a punishment technology. This design may be useful in isolating 
possible elements or economic institutions that can facilitate selecting the cooperative 
equilibrium in a more general setting. 
   As noted earlier, the matching protocol across supergames is also important because 
of possible contagion effects across supergames. It is therefore helpful to mention the 
various protocols adopted in previous experiments. To play a supergame in a session with 
N participants, subjects can be partitioned into K economies. The way we ran multiple 
supergames is to ensure that any two subjects were never assigned to the same economy 
for more than one supergame. A more rigorous partitioning procedure in the experimental 
literature is to rule out that anyone may share a common past opponent.
3 Both procedures 
control for contagion effects.
4 This contrasts with randomly matching the same set of 
subjects after each period and after each supergame (for instance, Schwartz et al., 1999, 
and random pairing in Duffy and Ochs, 2006). 
 
3 Experimental design 
This experiment has four treatments (Table 1). While the stage game (Table 2), the 
continuation  probability,  and  matching  protocols  were  identical  across  treatments,  we 
manipulated the amount of information and the punishment options available to subjects. 
The efficient outcome can be supported as an equilibrium in all treatments. 
                                                 
3  In Dal  Bó (2005) each subject plays three supergames (treatment). In the “Dice” sessions, in each 
supergame  participants  are  partitioned  into  K=(N/2)  two-person  economies.  The  partitioning  across 
supergames is such that the decisions one subject made in one supergame could not affect, in any way, the 
decisions of subjects he or she would meet in the future. Ensuring the absence of contagion effects in this 
manner requires very large session sizes. For a theoretical discussion of matching procedures see Aliprantis 
et al. (2006, 2007). 
4 In our study each subject played for five supergames. Subjects may have shared a common past opponent 
in supergames three or later. Aoyagi and Frechette (2003) used a different in between matching protocol; 
each agent plays G>10 supergames. In the first 10 supergames they partition agents as in the former way 
described in the main text above and in the last (G-10) supergames the randomly rematch participants.   7
Table 1: Comparison of experimental designs
(*) 
 


















No  Partner-not in this study  (i)  (i)  (i) 
           
Random 
matching 
No  Public monitoring  
(non-anonymous) 
Yes  Yes  Yes 
           
  Yes  Anonymous public monitoring 
 
Yes  Yes   
  Yes  Private monitoring 
 
  Yes   
  Yes  Private monitoring with 
punishment 
  Yes  (ii) 












Table 2: The stage game 
 
       (A) Notation in the theoretical analysis             (B) Parameterization of the experiment 
 
The  stage  game.  The  stage  game  is  a  standard  prisoners’  dilemma  with  payoffs 
determined according to Table 2 (payoffs to column and row players, respectively).
5 We 
call action Y cooperate and action Z defect. So, we say that there is cooperation in the 
                                                 
(*) (i) In partner, the distinction among targeted, reactive, and global strategies is irrelevant because of the 
fixed  matching.  (ii)  One  could  interpret  the  possibility  of  personal  punishment  as  a form of targeted 
strategy, although the personal punishment reduces the continuation payoffs for the punisher more than 
with the reactive strategy. Personal punishment expands the set of strategies. In particular it allows for a 
targeted strategy because an agent can punish his opponent after observing the choice of his opponent. 
5 We selected this parameterization as it scores high on the indexes proposed by Rapoport and Chammah 
(1965), Roth and Murnighan (1978),  and Murnighan and Roth (1983) that correlate with the level of 
cooperation in the indefinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma in a partner protocol. Also, in Table 2 we have 
h y z l < < < £ 0  and  y h l z 2 2 < + < . 
Player 1/ 
player 2  Y  Z    Player 1/ 
player 2  Y  Z 
Y  y y,    h l,      Y  25, 25  5, 30 
Z  l h,    z z,      Z  30, 5  10, 10   8
pair  only  if  both  subjects  choose  Y.  Consequently,  we  will  define  the  degree  of 
cooperation in the economy according to how many pairs cooperate. 
The supergame. A supergame (or cycle, as we will call it) consists of an indefinite 
interaction among subjects achieved by a random continuation rule, as first introduced by 
Roth and Mangham (1978). A supergame that has reached period t continues into t + 1 
with a probability ) 1 , 0 ( Î d , so the interaction is of finite but uncertain duration. We 
interpret the continuation probability δ as the discount factor of a risk-neutral subject. 
The expected duration of a supergame is 1/(1-d) periods, and we set δ = 0.95, so in each 
period the supergame is expected to go on for 20 (additional) periods.
6 In our experiment 
the computer drew a random integer between 1 and 100, using a uniform distribution, and 
the  supergame  terminated  with  a  draw  of  96  or  of  a  higher  number.  All  session 
participants observed  the  same  number,  and so it could have also served as a public 
randomization device.  
The experimental session. Each experimental session involved twenty subjects and 
exactly  five  cycles.  We  built  twenty-five  economies  in  each  session  by  creating  five 
groups  of  four  subjects  in  each  of  the  five  cycles.  This  matching  protocol  across 
supergames was applied in a predetermined, round-robin fashion. More precisely, in each 
cycle  each  economy  included  only  subjects  who  had  neither  been  part  of  the  same 
economy in previous cycles nor were part of the same economy in future cycles. Subjects 
did not know how groups were created but were informed that no two participants ever 
interacted together for more than one cycle.  
Participants  in  an  economy  interacted  in  pairs  according  to  the  following  matching 
protocol within a supergame. At the beginning of each period of a cycle, the economy 
was randomly divided into two pairs. There are three ways to pair the four subjects and 
each one was equally likely. So, a subject had one third probability of meeting any other 
subject in each period of a cycle. For the whole duration of a cycle a subject interacted 
                                                 
6 With continuation probability δ, the expected number of periods is S = ( ) ) 1 /( 1 1
1





n n .   9
exclusively  with  the  members  of  her  economy.  By  design,  cycles  for  all  economies 
terminated simultaneously.  
Treatments. The experiment consisted of four different treatments that differed in the 
availability of information and punishment options (Table 3). All treatments maintained 
the same continuation probability, stage game parameters, and matching protocols. Two 
treatments were characterized by private monitoring, i.e., subjects could observe actions 
and outcomes in their pair, but not the identity of their opponent. One, denoted private 
monitoring, was the benchmark case as in Kandori (1992). The other, denoted private 
monitoring  with  punishment,  added  the  possibility  of  personal  punishment.  Subjects 
could  lower  the  earnings  of  their  opponent,  at  a  cost,  after  having  observed  their 
opponent’s action. In order to do so, we added a second stage to the one-shot game. The 
first stage was the prisoners’ dilemma in Table 2B. In the second stage actions were 
revealed,  and  subjects  had  the  opportunity  to  pay  5  points  to  reduce  the  opponent's 
earnings  by  10  points.  No  one  could  observe  any  of  the  actions  outside  their  pair, 
including the personal punishment. The remaining two treatments were characterized by 
public  monitoring,  which  simply  means  that  every  subject  could  observe  the  actions 
taken  in  every  pair.  In  one  treatment,  denoted  non-anonymous  public  monitoring, 
histories were associated with identities of subjects. In the remaining treatment, denoted 
anonymous public monitoring, subjects observed histories but not identities. 
To summarize, the availability of information about actions in the economy was set at 
one of three different degrees. First, subjects could be aware only of their own history 
(private monitoring, private monitoring with punishment) or of the history of the entire 
economy. Second, the history of the economy could be made available at an aggregate 
(anonymous public monitoring) or individual level (non-anonymous public monitoring). 
The history of the economy was provided at the aggregate level by listing everyone's 
actions in random order and without identifiers. On the contrary in the non-anonymous 
public monitoring treatment, individual histories were listed with the person's ID as label. 
This allowed a subject to inspect the opponent’s actions in previous encounters with her 
as well as the opponent’s behavior with others.   10
We recruited 160 subjects through announcements in undergraduate classes at Purdue 
University  and  signed  up  online.  The  sessions  were  run  at  the  Vernon  Smith 
Experimental Economics laboratory at Purdue University. No eye contact was possible 
among subjects, and copies of the instructions were on all desks. Instructions were read 
aloud.
7  Average  earnings  were  $29.50  per  subject.  A  session  lasted  on  average  110 
periods for a running time of 2.5 hours, including instruction reading and a quiz. Details 
about the number and length of sessions are provided in Table 3 (each session had 20 
participants and 5 cycles). 
 
Table 3: Four experimental treatments 
   
  Private monitoring  Anonymous public 
monitoring 
Private monitoring  
with punishment 




No subject IDs; 
own and current 
opponent’s action 
No subject IDs; list of 
all 4 group members' 
actions in random order 
No subject IDs; 
own and current 
opponent’s actions 
Subject IDs are 
public; individual 
histories of all 4 
group members 
 
Punishment  Subjects can only 
punish by defecting 
Subjects can only 
punish by defecting 
Subject can pay 5 
points to reduce 
opponent's payoff 
by 10 points 
Subjects can only 
punish by defecting 
Session date  21.4.05  7.9.05  27.4.05  1.9.05  28.4.05  6.9.05  12.4.05  8.9.05 
Show-up 
fee 
$5  $5  0  0  $5  0  0  0 
Periods  71  104  129  125  139  99  86  128 
 
 
4 Theoretical predictions  
We first introduce a theoretical framework for the private monitoring treatment based 
on  Kandori  (1992)  and  then  discuss  the  other  treatments,  in  particular  the  private 
monitoring  with  punishment  and  public  monitoring.  The  analysis  is  based  on  the 
assumption of identical players, who are self-regarding and risk-neutral, in the absence of 
commitment and enforcement.
8  
                                                 
7 A copy of the instructions can be found at http://www.mgmt.purdue.edu/faculty/casari/anonymous.htm 
8 The theoretical framework is one of a homogeneous population. An alternative approach is to consider 
subjects of different types in the experiment as, for example, in Costa- Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta 
(2001) and Healy (forthcoming).   11
  An  “economy”  is  composed  of  four  players  a,  b,  c,  and  d  who  interact  for  an 
indefinite number of periods denoted t = 1, 2, .... Participants are randomly paired to play 
the  prisoners’  dilemma  of  Table  2.  There  are  three  ways  to  pair  participants  in  an 
economy, {ab, cd}, {ac, bd}, or {ad, cb}, and in each period one pairing was randomly 
chosen with equal probability.
9 
4.1 Equilibrium in the stage game 
Consider the stage game described in Table 2A, which is a prisoners’ dilemma. The 
players simultaneously and independently select an action from the set  } , { Z Y . We allow 
for mixed-strategies. Let  ] 1 , 0 [ Î p  denote the probability that the representative player 
selects Y, and  p - 1  the probability that he selects Z. We use  ] 1 , 0 [ Î P  to denote the 
given selection of the opponent. 
The unique Nash equilibrium is defection. In equilibrium both players choose Z, the 
minmax  action,  and  earn  z,  the  minmax  payoff.  The  representative player’s payoff is 
simply his expected utility, denoted U. This can be rearranged as: 
)] )( 1 ( ) ( [ ) ( l z y h z h z U - P - + - P - - P + = p . 
The player maximizes U by choosing π, so can assure himself payoff z, independent of Π. 
Notice that U is linear in π, and we have assumed h y <  and  z l < . It follows that the 
player’s best response is to set π = 0, for any Π ≥ 0. 
Since  y h l z 2 2 < + < , total surplus in the economy is maximized when each pair 
cooperates. Thus, we refer to the outcome where both players in both pairs select Y as the 
(Pareto)  efficient  or  fully  cooperative  outcome.  If  both  pairs  in  the  economy  select 
} , { Z Z , then we say that the outcome is inefficient. A Nash equilibrium is a fixed point in 
the players’ aggregate best response, so π = Π = 0 is the unique equilibrium. 
4.2 Equilibrium in the indefinitely repeated game with private monitoring 
With  private  monitoring  indefinite  repetition  of  the  stage  game  with  randomly 
selected  opponents  can  expand  the  set  of  equilibrium  outcomes.  In  this  section  we 
                                                 
9 Strictly speaking, we are dealing with a game with varying opponents, since players are paired randomly 
at each point in time. However, action sets and payoff functions are unchanging. Thus, we refer to it as a 
supergame, following the experimental literature.   12
provide sufficient conditions so that the equilibrium set includes the efficient outcome, 
following  the  work  of  Kandori  (1992)  and  Ellison  (1994).  This  is  achieved  when 
everyone cooperates in every match and in every period. 
The  private  monitoring  treatment  is  characterized  by  two  informational  frictions. 
Players  cannot  observe  identities  of  opponents,  so  we  say  that  players  are  strangers. 
Second, players can neither communicate with each other nor observe action histories of 
others; they can only observe the outcome resulting from actions taken in their pair.  
Clearly, the inefficient outcome can be supported as a sequential equilibrium through 
the  strategy  “defect  forever.”  Because  repeated  play  does  not  decrease  the  set  of 
equilibrium payoffs, Z is always a best response to play of Z by any randomly selected 
opponent. In this case the players’ payoff in the indefinitely repeated game is the present 
discounted value of the minmax payoff forever z/(1-d). 
If δ is sufficiently high, however, then the efficient outcome can be sustained as a 
sequential equilibrium. Formally, we have the following result. 
 
Lemma 1. Let  ) 1 , 0 (
*Î d be the unique value of d that satisfies 
0 ) ( 3 ) 2 ( ) (
2 = - - - - + - y h z y h z h d d . 
If d ³ d 
*, then the efficient outcome can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium. In an 
economy with full cooperation, every player receives payoff   y / (1-d). 
The proof is in Appendix A and follows that found in Kandori (1992). Here, we 
provide intuition. Conjecture that players behave according to actions prescribed by a 
social norm; a social norm is simply a rule of behavior that identifies “desirable” play and 
a sanction to be selected if a departure from the desirable action is observed. We identify 
the desirable action by Y and the sanction by Z. Thus, every player must cooperate as 
long as she has never played Z or has seen anyone select Z. However, as soon as a player 
observes Z, then she must select Z forever after. This is known as a grim trigger strategy. 
In our experiments, this strategy is equivalent to what we call a reactive strategy (i.e., a 
player will choose Z if and only if one of his opponents has chosen Z). 
Given this social norm, on the equilibrium path everyone cooperates so the payoff to   13
everyone  is  the  present  discounted  value  of  y forever: y/(1-d). A complication arises 
when a player might want to defect since y h> . Hence, since  y z< , it must be the threat 
of minmax forever that deters a player from defecting. Notice that a player deviates in 
several instances—first, in equilibrium, if she has not observed play of Z in the past but 
chooses Z currently, and second, off-equilibrium, if she has observed play of Z in the past 
but plays Y currently. 
Consider one-time deviations by a single player (unimprovability criterion). It should 
be clear that cooperating when no defection has ever been observed is optimal only if the 
agent is sufficiently patient. The future reward from cooperating today must be greater 
than  the  extra  utility  generated  by defecting today.  Instead,  if a defection occurs and 
everyone plays according to the social norm, then everyone will end up defecting since 
the  initial  defection  will  spread  by  contagion.  Given  that the  economy  has only four 
players, this contagion in our experimental economies should occur very quickly. This is 
illustrated in Figure 1, by the line labeled reactive strategy. 
Cooperating after observing a defection should also be suboptimal. Choosing Y in this 
instance can delay the contagion but cannot stop it. To see why, suppose a player has 
observed Z. If he meets a cooperator in the following period, then choosing Y generates a 
current loss to the player because he earns  y  (instead of  h). If he meets a deviator, 
choosing Y also generates a current loss because he earns l rather than  z . Therefore, the 
player must be sufficiently impatient to prefer play of Z to Y. The smaller are  l and  y , 
the greater is the incentive to play Z. Our parameterization ensures this incentive exists 
for all  ) 1 , 0 ( Î d  so it is a dominant strategy to play Z after observing (or selecting) Z.  
Assuming a homogenous population in our experimental economies, the preceding 
discussion has two immediate predictions, which are put forward below. 
 
Proposition  2.  In  our  experimental  economies  with  private  monitoring,  the  efficient 
outcome can be sustained as an equilibrium. 
Proposition 2 follows directly from Lemma 1. For the efficient outcome to be a feasible, 
we need 
* d d ³ . In our experimental design  d = 0.95 and 443 . 0
* = d , a value that   14
solves the condition in Lemma 1 for the parameterization given in Table 2B.
 10 
 
Proposition  3.  In  our  experimental  economies  with  private  monitoring,  the  efficient 
outcome can be sustained as an equilibrium without using personal punishment. Instead, 
this outcome cannot be sustained as an equilibrium by relying exclusively on personal 
punishment. 
Recall that with personal punishment an agent has the option, at a cost, to lower the 
current  earnings  of  his  opponent  only  after  observing  the  outcome  of  the  prisoners’ 
dilemma. In a one-shot interaction, choosing personal punishment is a dominated action 
because it is costly for the punisher. In our design the interaction is indefinitely repeated, 
but personal punishment is still individually suboptimal for the same reason it is in the 
one-shot game.  
Personal punishment is dominated for two reasons. First, it does not trigger a faster 
contagion to the state of economy-wide defection. In our design agents are anonymous, 
randomly matched in each period, and can only observe actions and outcomes in their 
pair. Hence, to someone outside the match, a choice of personal punishment is no more 
visible than a choice of defection. Because of private monitoring, personal punishment is 
no more efficient than a “grim trigger” defection strategy, and in addition, it is costly. 
Second, the sole use of personal punishment cannot sustain cooperation, even with 
public monitoring. The reason is that personal punishment is not a credible threat because 
after observing a defection, it is never individually optimal to pay the cost for personal 
punishment.
11 For instance, a strategy where agents always cooperate and respond to a 
defection only with personal punishment for the period cannot sustain cooperation. After 
the opponent defects, an agent has no incentive to inflict personal punishment because it 
simply  adds  a  further  loss.  Additionally,  the  incentive  to  defect  in  following  periods 
                                                 
10 Contagion equilibria as in Kandori (1992) are not robust to adding a small amount of noise in the 
observation of individual behavior. With noise, equilibria arise similar to those in the continuum limit 
where individual behavior is unobservable (e.g., see Al-Najar and Smorodinsky, 2001, Fudenberg, Levine, 
and Pesendorfer, 1998, Levine and Pesendorfer, 1995). One can suppose that the larger the population, the 
greater the instances of noise in observability. To lessen such instances in our experimental economies, we 
work with four-agent economies, the smallest possible number that allow pairwise anonymous matching. 
11 On the contrary, defecting after having observed a defection is an optimal strategy.   15
remains  because  defection  is  the  unique  best  response  in  the  one-shot  game.  In 
conclusion, though personal punishment is a sufficient threat to sustain cooperation, it is 
not a credible one. 
4.3 Equilibrium in the indefinitely repeated game with public monitoring 
In this section we specify that the efficient outcome can also be sustained as a 
sequential  equilibrium  in  the  treatments  in  which  the  history  of  actions  taken  in  the 
economy is public information. Of course, with more information the possible strategies 
that sustain the efficient outcome are expanded. 
 
Proposition  4.  In  our  experimental  economies  with  public  monitoring,  the  efficient 
outcome can be sustained as an equilibrium. 
When we allow for public monitoring, instead, the value of  * d  can only fall. It is now 
0.25  since  according  to  the  grim  trigger  strategy,  a  current  defection  implies  a  sure 
defection by any future partner. This is illustrated in Figure 1 by the line denoted global 
strategy,  representing  a  grim  trigger  strategy  in  which  permanent defection occurs  as 
soon as a defection is detected anywhere in the economy (in or outside the pair). 
 









































































One agent deviates in period 0 
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The  important  aspect  of  public  monitoring  is  that  giving  more  information  about 
actions  is  beneficial  to  cooperators  in  several  different  respects.  First,  a  player  who 
observes a deviation might have the option to defect in the future only with a subset of 
players  (for  instance,  those  known  to  have  deviated).  This  can  only  increase  the 
frequency  of cooperation in the economy because it allows players to cooperate with 
those known to cooperate. Second, a player is less likely to experience a defection as a 
result of a past defection by someone else. In addition more information is detrimental to 
deviators, since  they can be targeted more effectively. All of these elements serve to 
increase  the  payoff  for  a  cooperator  and  decrease  it  for  a  deviator,  which  generates 
incentives to cooperate for even lower discount factors. 
Below we identify three broad classes of strategies. They do not exhaust all possible 
behaviors but are indicative of three intuitive ways of behaving.  First, players could 
switch from a cooperative mode to a punishment mode when they observe a defection, no 
matter if coming from an opponent or someone else in the economy. We have already 
called it a global strategy. Conversely, players could switch to a punishment mode when 
they observe an opponent defect, but stay in cooperative mode if a defection is observed 
elsewhere in the economy, what we refer to as a reactive strategy. Finally, an even more 
selective strategy would involve a player switching to a punishment mode after observing 
an opponent defect, limiting defections only to future encounters with the same opponent, 
while staying in a cooperative mode with anyone else. We refer to this as a targeted 
strategy. It is easily demonstrated that, with a targeted strategy, the efficient outcome is 
optimal as long as d is greater than 0.5. 
In random matching with non-anonymous public monitoring all classes of strategies 
are available. On the contrary, with private monitoring reactive strategies are available, 
but global and targeted strategies are not. Hence, variations in cooperation level between 
treatments could suggest what class of strategies enhances cooperation (see Table 1). 
One  can  classify  strategies  also  using  a  “power”  and  a  “selectivity”  score.  Power 
relates to the incentives to keep cooperating, while selectivity relates to the incentives to 
punish following a defection. The power of a strategy is the maximum punishment that   17
can  be  inflicted  on  a  defector,  which  depends  on  the  immediacy  and  frequency  of 
punishment. Global strategies have the most power because punishment can take place 
the following period and applies to everyone (Figure 1)—all else being equal, the greater 
the power, the lower the continuation payoff for someone who defects when everyone 
else is cooperating. Hence, a strategy with greater power reduces the incentives to defect. 
Global strategies provide the largest possible threat since punishment is immediate and 
indiscriminate. Targeted strategies have the least power, while reactive strategies occupy 
a space in-between the two. For example, with public monitoring, the lower bound for d 
falls by about 40% when we move from a reactive strategy to a global strategy, and by 
about 50% when we move from a targeted strategy to a global strategy. 
The selectivity of a strategy is linked to the incentives to punish defectors. Targeted 
strategies are the most selective and allow agents to punish at the lowest cost. We use the 
term selectivity because it is related to the richness of information needed to support 
cooperation. A more selective strategy requires a finer partition of the information set. 
 
5 Results 
We  first  present  results  on  the  aggregate  outcome  (Results  1-6)  and  then  on  the 
strategies employed to sustain those outcomes (Results 7-11). The section is broken up by 
treatment so that the discussion can be more focused. 
 
Result  1.  The  introduction  of  public  monitoring  in  the  non-anonymous  treatment 
increased cooperation over private monitoring.  
Figures 2 and 3 and Table 4 provide support for Result 1. In the non-anonymous 
public  monitoring  average  cooperation  across  economies  is  81.5%.  For  an  economy 
k=1,..,50 we define the action ait
k of an agent j=1,..,4 in period t=1,..,T
k of economy k to 
be an element ait
kÎ{0,1}º{Z, Y}; a cooperative action is coded as 1 and a defection is 










































= ∑ . Although economies have different length T
k, they are 
given equal weight in our measure c of average cooperation across economies. 
 



















A Mann-Whitney test conducted on cooperation in non-anonymous public monitoring 
shows significant difference with private monitoring (59.5%, p-value 0.0001) and with 
anonymous public monitoring (58.6%, p-value 0.0000). Result 1 is consistent with data 
reported in the literature of high levels of cooperation in the partner treatment. Similar to 
a partner design, participants interact in pairs and know the whole individual history of 
interaction, but unlike it, the match for the period is randomly picked from a group of 
three other individuals. 
We also report the distribution of the fifty economies by average cooperation level, 
which is illustrated in Figure 3. About 38% of the economies have cooperation rates 
above 98%. The superiority of non-anonymous public monitoring is clear also from the 
average cooperation in the initial period across economies, shown in Table 4. 
                                                 
(*) We aggregated economies from all cycles by treatment and carried out Mann-Whitney tests of pairwise 
differences in cooperation between treatments. Differences are statistically significant at 1% level with two 
exceptions:  private monitoring vs. anonymous public monitoring and private monitoring with punishment 
vs. non-anonymous public monitoring. One economy is one observation; in each comparison n1=n2=50.   19
 





































  73.5%  70.5%  84.5%  87.0% 
Frequency of cooperation in an economy 
4  36%  26%  50%  54% 
3  30%  42%  38%  40% 
2  28%  22%  12%  6% 
1  4%  8%  0%  0% 
0  2%  2%  0%  0% 
Frequency of cooperation in a match 
2  58%  51%  71%  75% 
1  31%  39%  27%  24% 
0  11%  10%  2%  1% 
                                                 
(*) Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-tail two-sample test on distributions confirms results from the Mann-Whitney 
tests  on  the  differences  between  averages.  On  one  hand  private  monitoring  and  anonymous  public 
monitoring are not statistically different (10% confidence level, n1=n2=50). Conversely, private monitoring 
with punishment and non-anonymous public monitoring are not statistically different. Treatments from the 
two groups are instead statistically different at least at a 5% level. 
(**) In each treatment the number of observations is 50 for “average” and “frequency of cooperation in an 



























































Private Monitoring With Punishment
Non-anonymous Public Monitoring
 
Result 2. Cooperation did emerge in economies with private monitoring. Cooperation in 
later cycles is higher than in earlier cycles. 
Figures  2 and 3  and  Table 4 provide support for Result 2. In the private monitoring 
treatment average cooperation across economies was 59.5% for all periods and 73.5% for 
just  the  first  periods,  which  are  remarkably  high  given  results  in  previous  studies 
(Schwartz et al., 1999; Ochs and Duffy, 2006). This provides support to the empirical 
relevance of the theoretical results of Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994). 
The average cooperation had an increasing trend across cycles, as seen in Figure 4.  
 



















This figure suggests that as subjects became familiar with the incentive structure of 
the indefinite repetition, they responded by increasing cooperation level.
12 This finding is 
in line with previous studies (Aoyagi and Frechette, 2003; Dal Bó and Frechette, 2006) 
and marks a difference with finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemmas and voluntary public 
                                                 
12 There is statistically significant learning across cycles. We aggregated economies from all treatments by 
cycle and carried out Mann-Whitney tests of pairwise differences in cooperation between cycles. The 
increment between cycle 1 and 5 is significant at 1% level. The most significant jump in cooperation level 
is from cycle 1 to cycle 2 (5% significance) while the difference between cycles 4 and 5 is not significant at 
a 10% level (one economy is one observation; in each comparison n1=n2=40).   21
good  games,  where  average  cooperation  in  experiments  is  generally  positive  but 
declining over time (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1994). Even if one expects some degree of 
cooperation in our private monitoring economies given the salience of the payoffs, the 
increase  in  cooperation  from  one  cycle  to  the  next  displayed  in  Figure  4  is  in  sharp 
contrast with the evidence from finitely repeated games. 
 
Result 3. In the anonymous treatments, the introduction of public monitoring did not 
improve cooperation over private monitoring. 
Subjects in public monitoring possess information about the choices of others that is 
unavailable  in  private  monitoring.  Figure  2  shows  that  when  this  information  is 
anonymous, it does not foster cooperation. Average cooperation is around 59% in both 
treatments, and the difference is statistically insignificant (Mann-Whitney test, p-value 
0.418, n1=n2=50). First period averages lead to the same conclusion (Table 4). 
 
Result  4.  The  introduction  of  personal  punishment  in  the  anonymous  treatments 
increased cooperation.  
Figures 2 and 3 and Table 4 provide support for Result 4. When we add personal 
punishment  to  economies  with  private  monitoring,  average  cooperation  jumps  from 
59.5% to 74.2%. This difference is statistically significant at a 1% level (Mann-Whitney 
test,  p-value  0.0067).  This  difference  is  also  evident  when  comparing  average 
cooperation in the first period of each cycle (73.5% vs. 84.5%, Table 4). Surprisingly, 
average  cooperation  is  statistically  indistinguishable  from  the  non-anonymous  public 
monitoring treatment (Mann-Whitney test, p-value 0.154). 
 
Result  5  (Realized  efficiency).  In  the  anonymous  treatments,  the  introduction  of 
personal  punishment  increased  realized  efficiency  over  private  monitoring  and  over 
public monitoring.  
The  comparison  among  treatments  in  terms  of  realized  efficiency  substantially 
confirms  the  conclusions  drawn  in  Results  1-4  in  terms  of  average  cooperation.  We 
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Where the payoffs of the static-game are given Table 1 and range from minimum 
earnings of 10 to maximum earnings of 25 points. Realized efficiency ek ranges from 0 to 
1.  In  particular,  ek=0  when  everyone  in  the  economy  always  defect,  and  ek=1  when 
everyone  in  the  economy  always  cooperates.  With  personal  punishment  realized 
efficiency can be negative, with a minimum of -1 when everyone always defects and 
always punishes. The realized efficiencies for the four treatments in the experiment were 
59.5%, 58.6%, 65.2%, and 81.5%, respectively. 
 
Results  6  (selection  of  equilibrium).  In  all  treatments,  period  1  cooperation  is 
significantly  different  than  zero.  Hence,  there  is  no  evidence  of  coordination  on  the 
inefficient outcome. 
Table 4 provides evidence for Result 6. Choices in the first period of each economy 
suggest whether some equilibrium among the many possible had a particularly strong 
drawing  power.  One  can  examine  how  subjects  coordinated  in  the  initial  period  by 
looking either at agreement of choices in the economy or in the pairwise match; see Table 
5 in Appendix B. Either way, we can rule out that subjects attempted to coordinate on 
defection. In particular, at least half of the economies started with full cooperation in two 
treatments, public monitoring (non-anonymous) and private monitoring with punishment. 
If we consider matches as the relevant unit of observation, both subjects cooperated in 
more than 50% of the matches in every treatment. 
 
Result  7  (strategy  employed).  There  is  evidence  of  use  of  reactive  strategies  in  the 
private  monitoring  treatment.  Subjects  who  observed  a  defection  by  their  opponent 
switched from a cooperative mode to a punishment mode. 
Table 5 (in Appendix B) and Figure 4 provide support for Result 7. Table 5 reports 
the results from a probit regression that explains the individual choice to cooperate (1) or 
not (0) using as regressors dummies that control for fixed effect (cycles, periods within 
the cycle, individuals), as well as the duration of the previous cycle, and a set of six 
regressors to trace the response of the representative subject to an observed defection. In 


















































Private Monitoring - Reactive
subject.  The  specific  choice  of  regressors is one among  many  possible  ways to trace 
strategies. One advantage is to detect whether subjects followed theoretically well-known 
strategies such as grim trigger or tit-for-tat (Axelrod, 1984). For simplicity our strategies 
embed a maximum delay of five periods. The grim trigger regressor
13 has a value of 1 in 
all  periods  following  an  observed  defection  and  0  otherwise.  The  five  tit-for-tat 
regressors have a value of 1 only in one period following an observed defection and 0 
otherwise. The first takes value 1 in the period immediately following the defection. The 
second takes value 1 in the second period following a defection, and so on.  
If subjects switched from a cooperative to a punishment mode following an observed 
defection, we expect at least one of the strategy regressors to be negative. For example, if 
subjects punished for just two periods following a defection, we expect the sum of the 
estimated  coefficients  of  the grim trigger regressor and the tit-for-tat regressors to be 
negative for the first and second period following a defection, and zero afterwards.  
 

















                                                 
13 We label a regressor “grim trigger” because it reminds us of the well-known grim trigger strategy, which 
specifies a permanent shift to punishment following a defection.    24
Figure 5 illustrates the marginal effect on the frequency of cooperation in the periods 
that  followed  an  observed  defection.
14  The  focus  on  the  first  five  periods  is  for 
convenience in showing patterns in the results. The representation for “any more than 
five” periods is based on the marginal effect of the grim trigger regressor only.  The 
representation for periods 1 though 5 is based on the sum of the marginal effects of the 
grim  trigger  regressor  and  the  relevant  tit-for-tat  regressor.  The  L-shaped  pattern  of 
response suggests a downward shift in cooperation levels immediately after a defection. 
This shift appears to be persistent. The grim trigger regressor is significant at a 1% level, 
and all other strategy regressors are significant at 10% level or more (Table 5).
15 
 
Result  8  (strategy  employed).  Two  types  of  strategies  were  used  in  the  private 
monitoring  with  punishment  treatment.  Subjects  who  observed  a  defection  by  their 
opponent sometimes employed personal punishment while staying in a cooperative mode. 
Other times, they switched from a cooperative mode to a punishment mode. 
Table 5 and Figure 6 provide support for the first part of Result 8. Similar to the 
private monitoring treatment, Figure 6 (see footnote 13) suggests a downward shift in 
cooperation levels following a defection, which is immediate and persistent. The grim 
trigger  regressor  is  significant  at  a  1%  level  (Table  5).  In  contrast  to  the  private 
monitoring treatment, the magnitude of the downward shift in cooperation levels is now 
substantially lower. 
One may conjecture that subjects sometimes continued cooperating but sanctioned 
through personal punishment. Table 6 shows that most of the personal punishment was 
given by cooperators when their opponent defected. In about 58% of such encounters, the 
cooperator requested personal punishment be inflicted on the opponent. 
                                                 
14 Figure 5 is based on Table 5 using the coefficient estimates coding reactive strategies. Period 0 is 
exogenously  set  at  0%.  The  point  for  “any  more  than  5”  is  the  marginal  effect  on  the  frequency  of 
cooperation of the grim trigger regressor. Periods 1 through 5 are the sum of two marginal effects on the 
frequency of cooperation, the effect of the grim trigger regressor plus the proper tit-for-tat regressor (i.e. 
coding reaction one period after the observed defection for period 1, coding reaction two periods after the 
observed defection for period 2, etc.). Marginal effects for the tit-for-tat regressors are computed for grim 
trigger regressor set at 1 (i.e. defection) 
15 Table 6 reports that the actual length of the previous cycle influenced the propensity of participants to 
cooperate—the  longer  the  previous  cycle,  the  higher  the  current  cooperation  level.  This  confirms  the 
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Table 6: Frequency of personal punishment
(*)  
 
  Opponent receiving punishment 
  Cooperate  Defect 
Cooperate  0.1%  58.3%  Subject requesting 
punishment  Defect  5.4%  5.2% 
 
 
Whenever a subject requested personal punishment, she was more likely to continue 
cooperating. Table 7A suggests that a cooperator encountering a defector was much more 
likely to cooperate in the following period when she requested personal punishment than 
when she did not; there was an astounding 29% point difference (75.5% vs. 46.7%).
16  
In  interpreting  Result  8,  recall  that  our  theoretical  framework  is  one  of  a 
homogeneous  population,  as  in  Kandori  (1992)  and  Ellison  (1994).  Within  this 
framework the punishment behavior we have observed seems at odds with equilibrium 
                                                 
(*) The unconditional frequency of personal punishment is 9.1%. Each cell indicates the frequency of 
personal punishment inflicted on the opponent conditional on the outcome in the match in stage one (there 
are four possible outcomes). The outcome (Cooperate, Defect) occurred 509 times. 
16 Table 7B suggests that a defector who had been punished by a cooperator was more likely to cooperate in 
the following period (34.5% vs. 24.1%). Once we controlled for all other factors, however, the evidence is 


















































s Anonymous Public Monitoring - Reactive
Anonymous Public Monitoring - Global
predictions, since  subjects  could  only  achieve  cooperation  by  triggering to permanent 
defection. As already noted, for our parameterization the set of outcomes does not expand 
with the addition of personal punishment. There are, however, behavioral reasons why 
subjects  may  have  preferred  personal  punishment  to  community  punishment.  In  the 
concluding section of the paper we will put forward some conjectures.  
 
Result  9  (strategy  employed).  Subjects  preferred  reactive  strategies  over  global 
strategies. In the anonymous public monitoring treatment, a defection by an opponent 
generated a stronger response than a defection elsewhere in the economy. 
In anonymous public monitoring subjects observed whether a defection had occurred 
in the match or elsewhere in the economy. Hence, both reactive and global strategies 
were available. A subject using a reactive strategy punished everyone once a defection in 
the match had been experienced, but kept cooperating if a defection was observed outside 
the match. In contrast a subject using a global strategy started punishing everyone once 
she had observed a defection, no matter if it came from an opponent or someone else. 
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Figure 7 and Table 5 provide evidence for Result 9. Figure 7 is based on the marginal 
effects estimated using regressions in Table 5.
17 In addition to what has already been 
explained above in relation to Figure 5, the cooperation choices for anonymous public 
monitoring includes additional six strategy regressors to trace global strategies (Table 5). 
The representative subject that experienced a defection displayed a strong and persistent 
decrease  in  future  cooperation  levels  (solid  line  in  Figure  7).  Conversely,  when  the 
representative subject observed a defection outside the match but did not experience it, 
the response was much weaker (dashed line in Figure 7).
18 
 
Table 7: Transitional matrices in private monitoring with punishment 
 
(A) Choice after a subject cooperated        (B) Choice after a subject defected  
       and opponent defected                and opponent cooperated 




Subject choice in the 
following period 
 
















Yes  75.5%  24.5%    Yes  34.5%  65.5% 
No  46.7%  53.3%    No  24.1%  75.9% 
 
Result 10 (strategy employed). Subjects preferred targeted strategies over reactive and 
global strategies. In the non-anonymous public monitoring treatment, a defection by an 
opponent  generated  a  strong  response  in  future  encounters  with  the  same  opponent, 
while defections outside the match were ignored.  
In  non-anonymous  public  monitoring  subjects  observed  all  individual  histories. 
Hence targeted, reactive and global strategies were all available. Recall that a subject 
using  a  targeted  strategy  punished  only  opponents  who  had  defected  in  previous 
encounters but cooperated with everyone else, even if they had defected in the past with 
someone else. 
                                                 
17 The graph uses the coefficient estimates coding reactive and global strategies, respectively. See footnote 
for Figure 5. Marginal effects for the reactive strategies were computed for the average values of global 
strategies regressors. Marginal effects for the global strategies were computed for the average values of 
reactive strategies regressors. 
18 The two lines in Figure 7 overlap for periods “any more than 5” because of how reactive and global 


















































Non-anonymous Public Monitoring - Targeted
Non-anonymous Public Monitoring - Reactive
Non-anonymous Public Monitoring - Global
Table 5 and Figure 8 provide evidence for Result 10. Figure 8 reports the marginal 
effects estimated using regressions in Table 5.
19 In addition to what has already been 
referenced  in relation  to  Figure  7,  the  cooperation choices for non-anonymous public 
monitoring includes six additional strategy regressors to trace targeted strategies (Table 
5).  The  representative  subject  that  experienced  a  defection  displayed  a  strong  and 
persistent  decrease  in  cooperation  levels  when  future  encounters  involved  the  same 
opponent (dark solid line in Figure 8). In contrast, there is little support for the use of 
either reactive or global strategies (light solid and dashed lines in Figure 8). 
 



























                                                 
19 The graph uses the coefficient estimates coding targeted, reactive and global strategies, respectively. See 
notes on Figure 5. Marginal effects for the targeted strategies were computed for the average values of 
reactive and global strategies regressors. Marginal effects for the reactive strategies were computed for the 
average values of targeted and global strategies regressors. Marginal effects for the global strategies were 
computed for the average values of targeted and reactive strategies regressors. 
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Result 11 (strategy employed). Subjects employed grim trigger strategies and did not 
revert to a cooperative mode. In all treatments a defection of an opponent triggered a 
persistent decrease in cooperation. In particular, following a defection, economies in 
public monitoring treatments did not appear to revert to a cooperative mode. 
While in private monitoring treatments, cooperation could be supported only through 
grim  trigger  strategies;  in  public  monitoring  treatments  cooperation  could  also  be 
supported through T-period trigger strategies.
20 Regression results from Table 5 allow us 
to  detect  if  such  type  of  strategies  were actually  employed.  In  that  circumstance  one 
should see after T period from a defection a full “recovery” to pre-defection cooperation 
levels.  However,  no  such  recovery  can  be  detected  from  Figures  7  and  8.  This  is 
consistent with previous findings in different settings (Mason and Phillips, 2002). After 
an initial drop, one period after the defection, one should observe an upward trend in the 
marginal effect curves of Figure 7 and 8. Instead, the curves look generally flat.  
 
6 Final Remarks 
We  studied long-run equilibria in experimental economies composed by strangers 
who play indefinitely a prisoners’ dilemma in pairs. Subjects are randomly matched and 
cannot directly communicate, and their identities and histories are private information. 
Achieving cooperation in this setting is difficult because subjects can neither commit to 
cooperation  nor  enforce  it,  especially  because  opponents  vary  randomly  over  time. 
Contrary to our expectations, we found that subjects did overcome these hurdles and 
cooperated  at  high  and  increasing  rates  (private  monitoring  treatment).  This  result 
provides empirical support to the well-known theoretical results of Kandori (1992) and 
Ellison  (1994),  who  specify  conditions under  which cooperation  is  an  equilibrium  of 
infinitely repeated games among strangers. Our empirical finding is a novel contribution 
given  the  weak  evidence  provided  on  this  point  by  previous  experimental  studies 
(Schwartz et al., 1999; Duffy and Ochs, 2006). 
                                                 
20  At  the  end  of  each  period,  everyone  observes  the  random  draw.  That  number  can  be  used  as  a 
coordination device. In particular, even in private monitoring subjects could coordinate a reversion to 
cooperation using that publicly observed number.    30
 We then built on this initial finding by studying if and how the introduction of some 
prototypical  institutions,  capable  of  reducing  either  informational  or  enforcement 
frictions,  would  impact  the  emergence  of  cooperation  (private  monitoring  with 
punishment,  anonymous  public  monitoring,  non-anonymous  public  monitoring 
treatments).  According  to  theory,  none  of  these  institutions  alters  the  lower  or  upper 
bound  of  cooperation  possible  in  equilibrium.  Yet,  they  had  a  remarkable  impact  on 
cooperation levels observed in the experiment. 
 In some treatments we increased the available information by displaying the histories 
of actions of everyone in the economy (public monitoring). Such information sometimes 
had no effect on aggregate cooperation levels and sometimes had startling effects. It turns 
out that  unless histories  could  be traced  back to a specific individual, this additional 
information  was  not  used.  In  the  anonymous  public  monitoring  treatment,  subjects 
received aggregate information about histories in the economy, but failed to exploit the 
information  to  increase  cooperation  above  the  private  monitoring  treatment.  Instead, 
when details about identities were added to this aggregate information (non-anonymous 
public  monitoring),  cooperation  was  considerably  higher.  Second,  in  some  treatments 
subjects had the costly option to lower the opponent’s payoff. In this personal punishment 
treatment  cooperation  levels  increased  so  dramatically  that  they  are  statistically 
indistinguishable from the non-anonymous public monitoring treatment. 
Another  main  contribution  of  the  paper  is  to  shed  light  on  the  classes  of  strategies 
employed by subjects who indefinitely play a prisoners’ dilemma. The subjects’ behavior 
in  our  experimental  economies  suggests  a  strong  preference  for  strategies  that  are 
selective  in  punishment  (i.e.,  a  preference  for  narrowing  down  the  sets  of  targets  of 
punishment). Indeed, when strategies with different levels of selectivity were available, 
subjects invariably chose the one with the most selective punishment. For example, when 
subjects  remained  anonymous  but  could  see  all  histories  in  the  economy,  the 
representative subject mostly defected only after having directly experienced a defection 
(reactive  strategy).  When  subjects  could  also  see  individual  identities,  then  the 
representative  subject  essentially  targeted  her  punishment  toward  those  who  directly   31
cheated her in previous encounters, but cooperated with everyone else. This is remarkable 
because the power of a targeted strategy (punish the culprit only) is lower than that of a 
global  strategy  (punish  everyone  as  soon  as  one  sees  a  defection);  the  latter  strategy 
immediately triggers an economy-wide defection, and as a result incorporates a bigger 
threat.
21  In  fact  our  data  suggest  that  the  threat  of  economy-wide  defection  has  low 
credibility. For instance, when economy-wide defection was the only available threat to 
support a cooperative outcome (private monitoring treatment), we observed the lowest 
levels of cooperation in all treatments in period 1. This result indicates that subjects may 
doubt that a single defection will trigger an economy-wide punishment. 
We derived some possible reasons for the frequent use of some classes of strategies. 
First, subjects may have other-regarding preferences,
22 in which case they would prefer 
punishment schemes that decreased the harm to cooperators while raising it for defectors. 
This attitude would suggest a strong preference for targeted strategies over reactive or 
global  strategies,  and  therefore,  a  reluctance  to  engage  in  economy-wide  defection.  
Second, subjects may prefer simpler strategies because of cognitive costs.
23 The results 
obtained provide mixed evidence on this point. A grim-trigger reactive strategy may be 
the simplest choice available because it requires knowledge of the outcome only in the 
current period and only in the subject’s match. Other strategies may involve a higher 
cognitive cost because they require the monitoring of identities, as when strategies are 
targeted, or of outcomes in other matches. Another dimension of complexity could be 
time-dependence as in t-period punishment strategies, which are not observed. In public 
monitoring  treatments  t-period  punishment  strategies  are  feasible  and  deliver  higher 
continuation  payoff.  Self-regarding  agents,  and  even  more  so  other-regarding  agents, 
should prefer t-period punishment to grim trigger strategies. Yet, punishment following a 
                                                 
21 If power is a criterion to select strategies, then in the anonymous public monitoring everyone should use 
a global strategy, which is not observed. In the non-anonymous public monitoring one should observe that 
a defector is punished by everyone in every future match, which is not observed. 
22 There is an experimental literature that validates this conjecture (e.g., see Fehr and Gaecther, 2002) and 
several  models  of  other-regarding  preferences  exists  that  alternatively  focus  on:  altruism,inequality 
aversion or reciprocity (see Sobel, 2005 for a review).  
23 The economies included just four subjects, and information was clearly displayed and easily accessible. 
So, one can hardly argue that monitoring identities and histories was a demanding task.   32
defection appears to have no reversal trend (i.e., we see little evidence of time-dependent 
strategies).  Although  this  observation  may  suggest  that  simplicity  plays  a  role  in  the 
selection of strategies, we also observe the use of more complex strategies that involve 
several contingencies, such as targeted strategies. 
The widespread use of personal punishment also deserves some discussion. Through 
personal punishment, a subject can directly and immediately lower the earnings of her 
opponent, which is not a best response for a self-regarding, rational agent (proposition 3). 
In the experiment, however, availability of personal punishment remarkably increased 
aggregate cooperation from the very first period. One can think of several reasons for the 
use of personal punishment. One is reciprocity because a subject may be happy to pay a 
cost to lower her opponent’s earnings in order to reciprocate for her defection. In this 
manner she avoids harming cooperators through punishing only those who have been 
unkind. Under private monitoring, a reciprocator had no other equilibrium strategy with 
comparable selectivity in punishing defectors.
24  Another reason is simplicity because 
personal punishment neither requires knowledge of others’ strategies nor coordination on 
some  informal  punishment  scheme.    Moreover,  personal  punishment  is  unavoidable. 
When using a reactive strategy, instead, punishing by defecting is uncertain because the 
interaction could suddenly end. A final reason for using personal punishment involves 
using a channel of costly communication, which may have helped in coordinating (e.g., 
see Cooper et al., 1996, Crawford, 1998, Van Huyck et. al, 2002).  
A tentative conclusion is thus that cognitive costs may play a minor role in driving 
strategy  choice,  while  other-regarding  preferences  may  be  more  relevant.  We  plan  to 
tackle this issue in future work. 
                                                 
24 If the subject uses a reactive strategy, she will punish the defector in future periods. Moreover, others in 
the economy will eventually punish that defector.    33
Appendix A 
Proof of Lemma 1 
In this section we develop the proof of the Proposition. We start by discussing payoffs, 
given  a  deviation.  A  player  deviates  from  desired  play  in  two  instances:  In-  or  off-
equilibrium, if she has not observed a deviation in the past but chooses Z, currently. Off-
equilibrium, if he has observed a deviation in the past but plays Y, currently. Since the 
environment is stationary, by the unimprovability criterion we restrict attention to one-
time deviations. We also consider only single-player deviations. While this simplifies the 
analysis, deriving off-equilibrium payoffs still requires a bit of work (which is why we 
include the proof in the appendix). The problem is that players observe only the actions in 
their  pair;  in  order  to  calculate  expected  values,  we  must  know  how  uncooperative 
behavior spreads to the economy after a defection is observed.  
A1 The diffusion of sanctions in the economy 
Consider a representative period t and recall that there are 3 possible ways to pair four 
players.  Thus,  if  4 , , 1 L = d   is  the  number  of  players  who  choose  Z  currently,  then 
4 , , ' L d d =  is the number of deviators tomorrow, which depends on the current realization 
of the random pair.
25 As noted above, the central concern of a player is the likelihood that 
her/his opponent does not cooperate. Thus, we report the probabilities  d r that a player 
who selects Z today will meet a cooperator today, given that  d  players choose Z today. 
We also calculate Pr ] ' [ d d  (i.e., the probability that tomorrow there are  ' d  individuals 
who play Z, given that today there are d ). 
The first set of probabilities is needed to determine the expected current utility to a player 
who is aware of a deviation or that deviates, selecting Z. The second set of probabilities is 
needed to calculate the continuation payoff for a player who is aware of a deviation or 
that deviates, selecting Z. Indeed, they will give us transition matrices, allowing us to 
calculate the various probabilities that the sanction spreads to the rest of the economy. 
Notice  that  there  will  be  two  contingencies  to  consider.  In  one  case  we  calculate 
                                                 
25 Clearly, if   0 = t D , then  0 1 = + t D  with certainty.   34
probabilities  under  the  conjecture  that  every  player  follows  the  sanctioning  behavior 
specified by the social norm; the other is derived under the conjecture that one player 
deviates from the sanctioning behavior, once.  
Case 1. Off-equilibrium, everyone sanctions. Consider a player who currently selects 
Z. Let  ) , , , ( 4 3 2 1 r r r r r =  with  d r being the probability that he meets a cooperator given 
that  4 , , 1L = d  players currently select Z. Clearly, the probability that he meets someone 
who chooses Z is 1 −  r . Recall that each player can be paired to three other players, with 
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The bold numbers in the rows (columns) indicate the number  ) ( 1 + t t D D of players who 
currently  (next  period)  play  Z.  Each  cell  represents  the  corresponding  conditional 
probability Pr ] [ 1 t t D D + . Clearly, Pr [2|1] = Pr [4|3] = 1 since if an odd number of players 
plays Z today, then at least one of them is paired to a cooperator. The latter will choose Z 
in  1 + t .  Also,  Pr  [4|4]  =  1,  since  the  social  norm  does  not  specify  reversion  to 
cooperation.  To see why Pr [2|2] = 1/3 and Pr [4|2] = 2/3 recall that there are three 
possible pairings. One of those involves the two players who currently choose Z. So, with 
probability 1/3 the sanctioning behavior does not spread further. If that pairing is not 
realized,  then  Z  will  be  necessarily  seen  by  the  remaining  two  cooperators.  So,  with 
probability 2/3, next period everyone will choose the sanction, Z. 
Case 2. Off equilibrium, one player does not use the prescribed sanction. 
Suppose,  off-equilibrium,  a  player  who  observed  a  deviation  in  the  past  chooses  to 
deviate from the sanctioning rule and plays Y this period. Instead, everybody else follows 
the  social  norm.  Consider  this  player.  Again,  d r   is  the  probability  that  he  meets  a   35
cooperator given that  4 , , 1L = d  players have observed Z in the past. The probability that 
this player meets someone who chooses Z is  r - 1 . 
However, since this player chooses Y instead of Z, the transition matrix is now different:  
~ 0 1 0 0
0 1/3 2/3 0
0 0 1/3 2/3
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Again, Pr [2|1] = 1, since this is the case when no one observed a deviation in the past but 
someone chooses to play Z today. Also, Pr [4|4] = 1 since the player who deviates today 
by  choosing  cooperation  will  revert  back  to  playing  Z,  in  the  next  period  (onetime 
deviation). Now, consider the second row, i.e., the case when two players observed a 
deviation, but only one of them plays Z today (reverting to playing Z, tomorrow). Here, 
only one of the three possible pairings includes both players who observed a deviation. In 
this case the sanctioning behavior does not spread further. In the other two pairings, it 
spreads only to one more player, since only one player plays Z today. Hence, we have Pr 
[2|2] = 1/3 and Pr [3|2] = 2/3. The third line is similarly explained. 
A2 Off-equilibrium payoffs 
Using  the  matrices  above,  we  can  now  construct  off-equilibrium  payoffs  in  two 
contingencies. The first is in equilibrium, when the player deviates for the first time, 
choosing Z. The second is off equilibrium, when the player has observed uncooperative 
behavior in the previous date (i.e., has seen Z for the first time) and now deviates by 
cooperating, choosing Y. 
Payoff from a deviation, when everyone follows the sanctioning rule. Suppose that 
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where  d V  denotes the expected lifetime utility at the start of a period, before pairing 
takes place, to a player who selects Z currently, given that  4 , , 1L = d  players choose Z 
currently.
26  Using the vector of probabilities  r  and the transition matrix A, where we 
denote  d A  the 
th d  row of matrix A, we have: 
( ) d d d V z h z r d = + - + A V  
 That  is,  the  expected  current  utility  depends  on  the  probability  of  encountering  a 
cooperator. When he meets a cooperator the player earns  h , and otherwise he earns  z . 
The continuation payoff is 0 with probability  d - 1 , and it is  d A V  with probability d . The 
latter component tells us that current play may lead to different numbers of cooperators 
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  (1) 
To see how we derive them, we discuss the first two lines. Consider the first line. If a 
player is the initial deviator, then he is certainly paired to a cooperator, i.e.,  1 1 = r  and 
earns current payoff h. The current cooperator will choose Z in the future. Thus, the 
current deviator’s continuation payoff is  2 V d . Consider the second line. Since the player 
chooses Z currently, he earns  z  if he meets the other only player who chooses Z (with 
probability 
3
1) and earns  h if he meets a cooperator (with probability 
3
2 ). This gives 
expected current utility  ) (
3
2
z h z - + . The continuation payoff depends on which one of 
these pairs took place. If he met the other deviator, no cooperator observes Z today, so 
tomorrow  there  will  still  be  two  players  who  select  Z.  Otherwise,  both  cooperators 
                                                 
26 Clearly, the agent selects Z as a deviation from equilibrium when d = 1. In this case the agent is the 
initial deviator. If d = 2, instead, the agent may select Z simply because he observed Z in the past and now 
follows the sanctioning rule. 
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Payoff from a deviation, when a player does not follow the sanctioning rule. Suppose 
d  players have observed a deviation in the past, and everyone follows the social norm 
except one of these players. This player defects from the sanctioning rule and cooperates. 
Let 
~
d V  denote the expected lifetime utility at the start of a period, before pairing takes 
place, to the player that has observed a deviation in the past but selects Y currently, given 
d . Using the vector of probabilities  r  and the transition matrix 
~
A , where we denote 
~
d A  its 
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When d  = 1, this means that no deviation was observed previously but someone chooses 
to deviate today. Therefore 
~
1 1 V V = , since it is the first period in which a deviation is 
observed.  For  the  case  2 ³ d   notice  that  only  1 - d   players  choose  Z  currently,  the 
remaining one choosing Y . Therefore we must use the matrix 
~
A . 
In that case, we see that  ) ( l y l d - +r  is the expected current utility from meeting either a 
cooperator or not. Since the player cooperates, when he meets a cooperator, he earns  y , 
and otherwise he earns l. Again, the continuation payoff is 0 with probability  d - 1 , and it 
is  d
~
A V with probability  d . We use  V  and not 
~
V in the continuation payoff, since 
everyone reverts to the sanctioning rule specified by the social norm, from tomorrow on. 
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A3 Requirements for individual optimality 
In  this  section  we  check  that  the  actions  recommended  by  the  social  norm  are  best 
responses after any history of play. To do so we consider two issues. First, we derive a 
condition ensuring that choosing Z is not a best response on the equilibrium path. Second, 
we check that playing Y instead of Z, after having observed a deviation, is never optimal. 
Suboptimality  of  a  deviation,  in  equilibrium.  We  must  check  that  deviating  by 
choosing Z is suboptimal, relative to cooperating. That is:  
1
(3 ) (1 )
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an inequality that is rearranged as: 
0 ) ( 3 ) 2 ( ) ( 2 ³ - - - - + - y h z y h z h d d  
Let  ) (d f  define the expression on the RHS of the inequality. Notice that since h > y > z 
and  ) 1 , 0 ( Î d , then  0 ) ( ³ d f  for all  * d d ³  where  ) 1 , 0 ( *Î d  is the unique value of  d that 
solves  0 ) ( = d f . We have  0 * > d  since  0 ) 0 ( < f  and  0 ) ( ' > d f . Also,  1 * < d  since  0 ) ( ' > d f  for 
0 > d  and  0 ) ( 2 ) 1 ( > - = z y f . The parameterization of our experiment implies  443 . 0 * = d . 
Suboptimality  of  a  deviation,  off-equilibrium.  Here,  we  check  that  if  a  player  has 
observed Z in the past, then Y today is suboptimal. That is, since we have shown that 
choosing Z is never optimal, when  1 = d , we must find conditions such that 
~
d d V V ³  
for all  2 ³ d . To do so, use (1), (2) and (3). Clearly, 
~
4 4 V V ³ since  l z³ . Now consider 
the inequality 
~
3 3 V V ³ . Rearranging:  
3 3 4 4
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V V h z - = - . It is easy to see that for our parameterization this 
is satisfied by all  ) 1 , 0 ( Î d  since 
z h
y h l z
-
- + - ) ( ) ( 2  = 34. 
Finally, consider 
~
2 2 V V ³ . This inequality is immediately rewritten as: 
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The intuition is simple. Cooperating instead of sanctioning after observing a defection 
may be helpful to the player, since it delays the spread of the sanction. However, doing so 
generates  a current  loss to the player since he earns  y  (instead of  h) if he meets a 
cooperator, and  l (instead of  z ) if he meets a deviator. Therefore, the player must be 
sufficiently impatient to prefer play of Z to Y—clearly, the smaller l and  y , the greater 
the incentive to follow with the sanction. Our parameterization insures that this incentive 
exists for all  ) 1 , 0 ( Î d .   40
Appendix B 
























  Treatment 
dummies: 
           
        -0.04566*  -0.02924  Anonymous Public 
Monitoring           (0.02450)  (0.07313) 
        0.99813***  0.09188  Private Monitoring 
With punishment          (0.00010)  (0.06737) 
        0.94668***  0.11747*  Public Monitoring 
(non-anonymous)          (0.00951)  (0.06082) 
  Cycle dummies: 
Cycle 2 
0.03938  0.05750  0.08336***  -0.00304*  0.06190***  -0.03677 
  (0.10412)  (0.03787)  (0.02618)  (0.00179)  (0.02336)  (0.02852) 
Cycle 3  0.07621  0.05045  0.11154***  0.02014***  0.09321***  0.00613 
  (0.06949)  (0.05102)  (0.01972)  (0.00188)  (0.02688)  (0.02911) 
Cycle 4  0.13560***  0.18856***  0.14888***  0.12585***  0.17362***  0.04925 
  (0.00770)  (0.02515)  (0.03042)  (0.02706)  (0.02205)  (0.03559) 
Cycle 5  -0.16040***  0.28969***  0.13911***  0.13946***  0.21443***  0.08162*** 
  (0.04322)  (0.03196)  (0.03295)  (0.00420)  (0.02114)  (0.03126) 
Duration of previous 
cycle  
0.00133*  0.00272***  0.00249***  0.00413***  0.00362***  0.00327*** 
  (0.00076)  (0.00015)  (0.00033)  (0.00058)  (0.00082)  (0.00073) 
  Reactive strategies:               
Grim trigger  -0.55054***  -0.26642***  -0.38185***  0.07527  -0.38854***   
  (0.01458)  (0.07434)  (0.10006)  (0.05562)  (0.04064)   
0.08814**  -0.04836**  0.05643*  -0.06063  0.01797    Tit-for-tat with lag 1  
(0.04303)  (0.02415)  (0.02986)  (0.03933)  (0.02747)   
Tit-for-tat with lag 2  0.11608***  -0.09505***  0.04598*  -0.14011***  -0.02680   
  (0.03620)  (0.01776)  (0.02692)  (0.03122)  (0.03870)   
Tit-for-tat with lag 3  0.10324**  -0.07310*  0.04044  -0.06265***  -0.00994   
  (0.04237)  (0.04174)  (0.03453)  (0.00683)  (0.02686)   
Tit-for-tat with lag 4  0.08009***  -0.05838  0.01518  -0.05327  -0.03325   
  (0.00524)  (0.04672)  (0.04463)  (0.06054)  (0.02879)   
Tit-for-tat with lag 5  0.02974**  -0.07094***  0.01432  -0.01770  -0.04448*   
  (0.01385)  (0.00729)  (0.03021)  (0.04159)  (0.02311)   
                                                 
(*) Marginal effects are computed at the mean value of regressors. Robust standard errors for the marginal 
effects are in parentheses computed with a cluster on each session; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. For a continuous variable the marginal effect measures the change in the 
likelihood to cooperate for an infinitesimal change of the independent variable. For a dummy variable the 
marginal effect measures the change in the likelihood to cooperate for a discrete change of the dummy 
variable.  
First periods of each cycle are excluded with the exception of the last column. Individual fixed effects and 
period fixed effects are included but not reported in the table (individual dummies: s2-s30 s32-s37 s39 s41-
s60 s62-s97 s99-s159; period dummies: 3, 4, 5, 6-10, 11-20, 21-30, >30). A grim trigger regressor has 
value 1 in all periods following a defection and 0 otherwise. Five tit-for-tat regressors have value of 1 only 
in one period following a defection and 0 otherwise; we trace response up to a five-period delay. Details on 























  Global strategies:   
           
Grim trigger    -0.31089**    -0.11638***     
    (0.13126)    (0.00182)     
  0.22700***    0.02296      Tit-for-tat with lag 1  
  (0.01652)    (0.05930)     
Tit-for-tat with lag 2    0.22948***    0.02812     
    (0.06277)    (0.04358)     
Tit-for-tat with lag 3    0.24272***    0.04799**     
    (0.01007)    (0.02376)     
Tit-for-tat with lag 4    0.17551***    0.00537     
    (0.03108)    (0.02106)     
Tit-for-tat with lag 5    0.15494***    -0.03226     
    (0.01241)    (0.05412)     
  Targeted strategies:               
Grim trigger        -0.36340***     
        (0.04707)     
      -0.04395***      Tit-for-tat with lag 1  
      (0.00521)     
Tit-for-tat with lag 2        -0.05715***     
        (0.01385)     
Tit-for-tat with lag 3        -0.01781     
        (0.03301)     
Tit-for-tat with lag 4        -0.04346***     
        (0.00326)     
Tit-for-tat with lag 5        -0.06268***     
        (0.01560)     
Personal punishment             
    -0.07641        Requested (lag) 
    (0.08505)       
    0.02845        Requested (lag) 
´ opponent 
defected (lag) 
    (0.02884)       
Received (lag)      0.06715*       
      (0.03858)       
    -0.32918***        Received (lag)   
´ subject defected 
(lag) 
    (0.09712)       
Observations  3320  4880  4400  4280  16680  800 
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(NOT FOR PUBLICATION) 
 
Table 1A: Example of strategy coding 
 
Reactive strategies 
are based on (*) 
Global strategies 
are based on (**) 
Targeted strategies 
are based  
on (*) and on (***) 


























                             
1  7  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  16  0  0  0 
2  7  1  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  18  0  0  0 
3  7  1  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  0  9  0  0  0 
4  7  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  16  0  0  0 
5  7  0  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  0  16  1  1  0 
                             
6  7  1  1  1  0  1  1  1  0  1  18  1  1  0 
7  7  1  1  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  18  1  0  1 
8  7  1  1  1  0  0  0  1  1  0  9  0  0  0 
9  7  1  1  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  9  0  0  0 
10  7  1  1  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  18  1  0  0 
                             
11  7  1  1  1  0  0  1  1  1  0  9  0  0  0 
12  7  1  1  1  0  0  1  1  0  1  18  1  0  0 
13  7  1  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  16  1  0  1 
14  7  1  1  1  1  0  0  1  1  0  18  1  0  0 
15  7  1  1  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  9  0  0  0 
                             
16  7  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  16  1  1  0 
17  7  0  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  0  16  1  0  1 
18  7  0  1  1  0  1  1  1  0  0  16  1  0  0 
19  7  1  1  1  0  0  1  1  0  0  9  0  0  0 
20  7  1  1  1  0  0  1  1  0  0  18  1  0  0 
                             
21  7  1  1  1  0  0  1  1  0  0  18  1  0  0 
22  7  1  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  16  1  0  0 
23  7  0  0  1  1  0  0  1  1  0  16  1  1  0 
24  7  1  1  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  18  1  0  0 
25  7  0  1  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  9  0  0  0 
                             
 
Notes: (*) 1=cooperation, 0=defection, (**) 1=3 persons cooperated, 0=less than 3 persons cooperated; 
TfT=tit-for-tat regressor. Experimental data from session 8, cycle 1, periods 1-25 (non-anonymous public 
monitoring treatment). 
  